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Abstract: This paper explores the relevance of the concept of professional integrity in the 
context of the current climate of managerialism and marketisation in the social welfare fi eld. 
It considers the implications for professional integrity of the present organisational climate 
based on an ‘ethics of distrust’, the nature of the concepts of ‘integrity’ and ‘professional 
integrity’, and the possibility of professional integrity as part of an ‘ethics of resistance’. 
It draws on literature from moral philosophy and on interviews with senior practitioners 
in social work and related occupations.
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Introduction
‘Integrity’ is a word like ‘honor’ – its close kin – that sometimes seems all but 
archaic in the modern business world. (Solomon, 1997, p.215).
Social work and the ethics of distrust
As I will discuss in the next section, the term ‘integrity’ is generally used 
to refer to consistency in adhering to a set of principles and to people and 
actions that are honest, fair and truthful. ‘Professional integrity’ refers 
to integrity exhibited in professional life on the basis of a specifi c set of 
professional principles or values. If this characterisation of professional 
integrity is accepted, then it could be argued that there are certain features 
of the current organisational climate within which social work is practised 
that make professional integrity diffi cult to achieve. As Harris (2003, p. 56) 
comments, ‘If markets and businesses are everywhere, it is much harder 
to think outside them’. In the context of market competition, economy of 
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resources and maximising profi t, then ruthlessness and high performance 
may be more important than honesty. In a managerialist culture (see Banks, 
2004; Clarke, Gewirtz & McLaughlin, 2000), more concern may be placed 
on reaching predetermined targets and following prescribed procedures than 
that practitioners remain true to the values of their profession. The concern 
may be for doing a particular task ‘well’ (that is, according to the prescribed 
guidelines or procedures, in a fashion that is auditable), rather than for doing 
a ‘good job’ overall or for being a morally good practitioner.
As Harris acknowledges, it is managerialism rather than the quasi-
marketisation of the social welfare fi eld that has had the most profound 
effect. This move to regulate more closely the activities of professionals, 
by increased external monitoring and demands for accountability has been 
characterised by Chadwick and Levitt (1997, p.57) as ‘the ethics of distrust’. 
Whilst they do not elaborate further on what they mean by ‘the ethics of 
distrust’, I think it is being used here to refer to a set of externally imposed 
standards (ethics) that are based on the premise that practitioners cannot 
be trusted (distrust). The term is apt in that, although such measures are 
designed to increase trustworthiness, they can actually contribute to a 
further decline in trust. As O’Neill (2002a; 2002b) points out, the bodies that 
impose and enforce the standards are no more trusted than the professionals 
themselves. Furthermore, as professionals become more alienated from 
their roles, and doing the right thing is equated with following the rule or 
procedure, then the grounds for placing trust in them diminishes yet further 
(see Smith, 2001 for a useful discussion of diminishing trust in social work). 
In such a context, it could be argued, professional integrity is not required 
or valued, as professional integrity is premised on independence from rules 
and procedures, standing back and linking them to a broader set of goals, 
purposes and values.
On the basis of this discussion, it may be tempting to agree with Solomon 
(quoted at the start of this paper), that the term ‘integrity’ seems somewhat 
archaic, not just in the modern business world, but in life generally - in a 
world characterised as ‘postmodern’, where people’s lives are fragmented, 
their job roles specialised and specifi ed and identities are fl uid. The concept 
of integrity, with its connotations of continuity, perhaps of essentialism or 
a fi xed identity, seems to belong to a former era of certainty and solidity. 
Sociologists and philosophers are theorising about fragility, fragmentation and 
superfi ciality. Professional associations and regulatory bodies are developing 
codes of ethics and practice guidelines with a focus on principles of action 
and rules of conduct, rather than enduring qualities of character. Professional 
practitioners are focusing on performance of tasks and attaining outputs 
and outcomes. These trends in theory, policy and practice could be taken 
to suggest that:
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1. The achievement of professional integrity (as a kind of moral wholeness) 
is not possible. The world does not work in that way any more, even if 
it once did.
2. The aspiration or ideal of professional integrity (as something worth 
working towards, even if not achievable) is misguided, irrelevant or not 
useful.
In this paper I want to argue against both these propositions with particular 
reference to the social welfare work. In relation to the fi rst statement, I will 
suggest that the achievement of integrity in professional life is diffi cult 
rather than impossible. This relies on a certain view of ‘integrity’ as involving 
competence in resolving confl icts and priorities, readjusting ideals and 
compromising principles. It is about the work people do to sustain their 
fragile selves - what Walker (1998) calls ‘reliable accountability’. Regarding 
the second point, some features of policy guidance, codes of conduct and 
accounts given by professional practitioners suggest that integrity is still 
regarded as relevant and useful in public and private life.
Philosophical perspectives on the nature of integrity
We will now examine the concepts of ‘integrity’ and ‘professional integrity’ 
from a philosophical point of view.
‘Integrity’ as wholeness
‘Integrity’ is literally about ‘wholeness’. Our ordinary usage of the term suggests 
that this ‘wholeness’ may be created through an act of unifi cation of various 
aspects or parts, or it may be maintained or preserved (as in ‘remaining intact’). 
It is often used to describe a quality of an object, person or action, for example: 
‘that vase has a certain integrity’; ‘my father is a man of integrity’; ‘she acted with 
integrity’. In this paper we are not concerned with the application of integrity 
to objects (often used in an aesthetic context), but are interested in integrity 
in relation to people and actions. In particular, we are interested in moral 
integrity – as distinct from other types of integrity that may not necessarily have 
a normative or moral content, such as intellectual integrity, artistic integrity 
or bodily integrity (de Raeve, 1997). Frequently when the term ‘integrity’ is 
used in relation to people and actions, it is ‘moral integrity’ that is meant. In 
this context, it is often used when people appear or claim to hold onto their 
moral principles or commitments (exhibiting consistency), often in the face 
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of adversity or pressures. The term integrity is used particularly when people 
exhibit what is generally regarded as honest, fair or truthful behaviour (McFall, 
1987, p. 5). Sometimes the term is used loosely simply to refer to someone 
who upholds conventionally accepted moral standards.
In using the term ‘integrity’ as a moral quality (as in ‘man of integrity’), 
philosophers have often focused on the person’s conduct/actions taken as a 
whole, perhaps over the whole of a life lived so far (MacIntyre, 1981; Williams, 
1981) . When referring to particular actions (‘she acted with integrity’) a 
judgement may be made in the context of consistency with past actions 
and coherence with known values and commitments. This is, however, a 
problematic account of ‘integrity’, as it tends to focus on the form of ‘integrity’ 
(consistency, wholeness) and can led to a view of integrity as part of a rather 
grandiose life plan, which can then be criticised as archaic in the (post)modern 
world. There are other accounts of integrity that may be more useful.
‘Integrity’ as reliable accountability
Cox et al. (2002), following Calhoun (1995), criticise accounts of integrity 
that have been given by various philosophers that focus simply on the form 
of integrity. They are particularly critical of what they call the ‘integrated self’ 
view (integration of desires, evaluations and commitments into a whole), and 
the ‘identity’ view (integrity as adherence to identity-conferring projects). 
These accounts allow for people and actions that are ‘morally despicable’ (for 
example Hitler and his project to eliminate the Jews) to be characterised as 
demonstrating integrity provided that they exhibit consistency and coherence. 
Cox et al. argue both for an essentially normative aspect to integrity and for 
an account of integrity that may require abandoning one’s commitments. They 
argue for an account of integrity as ‘a capacity to respond to change in one’s 
values or circumstances, a kind of continual remaking of the self, as well as 
a capacity to balance responsibility for one’s work and thought’ (Cox et al., 
2002, p. 41). This is a much more dynamic account, which does not require 
a concept of an unchanging self or rigid identity.
This account does, however, rely on a version of virtue ethics theory and 
needs to be understood in this context. They characterise ‘integrity’ as a 
‘complex and thick virtue term’. A virtue is usually regarded as an excellence 
of character that contributes towards human fl ourishing (see Crisp & Slote, 
1997; Hursthouse, 1999; Slote, 2000). Unlike many virtue theorists, Cox et al. 
regard integrity as a virtue in its own right, rather than simply the unifi cation 
of all the other virtues. They use the Aristotelian characterisation of virtue as 
a mean between two excesses (although Aristotle himself does not discuss 
integrity as a virtue in this way). They suggest that it stands between the 
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qualities associated with infl exibility such as arrogance, rigidity, dogmatism, 
sanctimoniousness and those associated with superfi ciality and artifi ciality, 
such as capriciousness, weakness of will, self-deception, hypocrisy. The 
person of integrity, they suggest, ‘lives in a fragile balance between every 
one of these all-too-human traits’ (Cox et al., 2002, p. 41). They also argue 
that there are normative restrictions on what a person of integrity may do, 
suggesting that attributions of integrity presuppose ‘fundamental moral 
decency’ (p. 41). That is, they act on commitments that a reasonable person 
could accept as important (p. 65). This, of course, leaves open for debate 
what is regarded as ‘fundamental moral decency’, but we can assume that 
the substantive content mentioned earlier (such as honesty, fairness, truth-
telling) is what would count.
This account of integrity as a virtue (another archaic sounding word, but 
it is in current usage in moral philosophy to characterise an increasingly 
popular ethical theory) does seem a plausible view that takes account of 
many features of our ordinary usage of the term, including the fact that it is 
about both wholeness (form) and soundness (moral content). Walker (1998), 
writing from a feminist perspective, is equally critical of accounts of integrity 
that focus on its form, especially those that see integrity as requiring a whole 
life plan (Rawls, 1973), unconditional commitments or projects (Williams, 
1981) or as part of a quest (MacIntyre, 1981). She develops an ‘expressive-
collaborative’ approach to ethics, which regards the story as the basic form 
of representation for moral problems (Walker 1998, p. 110). Within this, 
integrity can be regarded as a kind of reliable accountability that we construct 
in the stories we tell about our relationships, identities and values. Stories are 
reworked and revised and help us to see ‘sense-making connections [that] 
serve to bundle up varied or repeating actions into legible confi gurations, such 
as neglecting a friendship or trying to disown a past’ (Walker 1998, p.110). 
Integrity is, I think, for Walker, a kind of moral competence. She argues 
that the point of integrity is ‘to maintain – or re-establish – our reliability in 
matters involving important commitments and goods’ (Walker, 1998, p. 106). 
It is based on the assumption that human lives are changing and are deeply 
entangled with others. We are often seeking, therefore, a local dependability 
(rather than global wholeness) and a responsiveness to the moral costs of 
error and change rather than consistency.
More could be said about integrity as it has featured in the literature 
of moral philosophy. However, the purpose of this brief overview is to 
provide a backdrop for the discussion of the relevance of the concept (in its 
various interpretations) to contemporary professional life, and in particular, 
professional social work.
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Professional integrity
Our discussion so far has focused on the generic concept of personal integrity. 
How does this relate to professional integrity? If personal integrity involves 
acting in accordance with one’s own values, commitments and principles, then 
it would seem logical for professional integrity to entail acting in accordance 
with the values, goals and principles of the profession to which one belongs. 
This assumes that there are discrete professions with commonly accepted 
sets of values and goals. This is a debate in itself, with which I have engaged 
elsewhere (see Banks, 2004). However, it is not necessary to mount a defence 
of professions (their existence, validity or usefulness) for us to explore 
what accounts can be given of the nature of professional integrity. Even if 
professions are questionable entities or at least in a state of fl ux, this does 
not prohibit the use of a concept of professional integrity (although it may 
make it diffi cult to implement). I will now outline four possible accounts of 
professional integrity.
1. Unity of personal and professional life
(1.a) Strong version
Vocation: Unity of personal goals and principles with those of the profession and 
the specifi c work role one is performing. This seems to be what is often meant 
by ‘vocation’ or calling. The person is able to live out their personal moral 
values in and through their work (see Bellah, Masden, Sullivan, Swidler & 
Tipton, 1988, p. 66; Blum, 1994, p.104). An ideal version of this would be 
that there are no contradictions and confl icts (perhaps a Buddhist monk 
may come close to this). A more realistic version would be that the aim is to 
reconcile personal and professional values and roles as far as possible, which 
may involve recognition of the need for compromise and readjustment of 
both personal and professional values. Regarding social work as a vocation 
in an ideal sense may be relatively rare these days due to the organisational 
constraints in both voluntary and statutory sector work. There is no doubt, 
however, that many practitioners still hope for some congruence between 
the values of ordinary life and work.
(1.b) Weak version
Everyday integrity: Acting with personal integrity in one’s work role. This is 
merely an extension of personal integrity into the work context. It does not 
rely on an assumption that there are discrete professions with distinctive 
principles and goals. It would entail acting consistently in terms of the 
ordinarily accepted values (honesty, fairness and so on). It is congruent with 
the view that there is no distinctive set of professional ethics – that is, the 
ethics of professional life are the same as those of ordinary life (Goldman, 
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1980; Veatch, 1981) – and so ‘professional integrity’ would simply be ‘everyday 
integrity’ manifested in the work role.
2. Holding to the principles of the profession
(2.a) Strong version
Ideal professional integrity: Holding true to the goals or service ideals of the 
profession. This assumes discrete professions with identifi able service ideals, such 
as health for medicine, or welfare for social work (Airaksinen, 1994; Koehn, 
1994; Oakley & Cocking, 2001). The notion of ‘service ideal’ encompasses 
both the idea of giving for the public good (‘service’) and a semi-transcendent 
value or aspiration (‘ideal’) (see Banks 2004, pp.53-58 for a fuller discussion 
of service ideals). This goes beyond what the professional codes and guidance 
currently promote, and is what I think Cox et al. (2002, p. 103) mean when 
they refer to the pursuit of a ‘semi-independent ideal of what the profession 
should be at its best’. This might lead one to stand fi rm against one’s employer 
or indeed the professional association’s current principles because they confl ict 
with what is judged to be the broad goal of the profession. This is the account of 
professional integrity perhaps most commonly encountered in the literature of 
professional ethics (for example, Oakley and Cocking, 2001, pp. 82-3). However, 
it may be less easy to achieve in practice if the notion of discrete professions 
with commonly recognised service ideals is disintegrating.
(2.b) Weak version
Professionalism: Steadfastly adhering to the currently accepted general principles 
of the profession and the specifi c codes/guidance produced by professional 
bodies in carrying out one’s work role. Cox et al. (2002, p. 103) have 
characterised this as ‘professionalism’ rather than ‘professional integrity’ 
in so far as it amounts to ‘pursuing the extant demands of the profession’, 
rather than the semi-transcendent ideals or goals mentioned in version 
(2.a). This might involve sticking with the commonly accepted standards of 
confi dentiality in the profession in a context where the employing agency 
demands a different standard.
Practitioner perspectives: The possibility of professional integrity
The next part of the paper draws on a series of interviews I undertook with 
senior social welfare professionals (people working in social, community and 
youth work) about changes in their work and ethical diffi culties they faced 
(further details of the three group and 32 individual semi-structured interviews 
are given in Banks, 2004, pp. 128-9). The interviewees were asked about the 
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impact of new accountability requirements (working to procedures, targets, 
outcomes) and inter-professional working. I did not specifi cally ask about 
professional integrity itself (indeed the term was rarely, if ever, used by either 
interviewer or interviewees) or about what might be thought of as components 
of professional integrity (such as impact on the sense of self or professional 
identity). Generally the interviewees recounted their views and opinions and 
gave practical and ethical reasons or justifi cations as to why they thought 
some of the changes in the work were benefi cial or otherwise (see Banks, 
2004, Chapters 5 and 6). They discussed their roles and featured themselves 
as moral actors in some of the stories they told, but generally they did not 
offer (and were not asked for) accounts that focused on their motivations, 
feelings, emotions or challenges to their sense of self or personal or professional 
identity. However, when analysing the interview transcripts, I was struck by a 
small cluster of comments by some of the interviewees that did speak in these 
terms, and that could be interpreted as being about professional integrity. In 
the section that follows I will offer extracts from the interviews to illustrate 
how the practitioners constructed accounts of aspects of themselves and their 
work in relation to the four senses of professional integrity outlined above.
Vocation
There were few clear accounts given in terms of strong professional integrity 
(unity of personal and professional values). However, while ‘vocation’ as a 
strong ideal is relatively rare in state-regulated social work, it may nevertheless 
be used as a yardstick against which to measure ‘how bad things have got’ 
and to use in deciding when to change jobs or ‘blow the whistle’. This can 
be illustrated by the comments of the manager of a child protection team 
(italics mine):
It’s not why I came into social work, I can’t believe I’m doing it. And you know, 
these changes are so insidious really, that you suddenly think, ‘what am I doing, 
talking about a child’s welfare in terms of how much it’s costing?’
This particular practitioner reported that she had already changed jobs 
(from mental health) as she had felt ‘disillusioned’ when the community care 
legislation came in.
Everyday integrity
Unexceptional integrity in the sense of following the ordinarily accepted 
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standards of honesty would be expected in professional life, and so was not 
generally noted by the senior practitioners interviewed, except in cases where 
the demands of the job were preventing this. For example, a statutory social 
worker working as part of an assessment and information team (dealing with 
new referrals) reported changes in the system for costing the services she was 
recommending to older people. She would make an assessment, recommend 
a service and have to ask people to sign a contract before they knew the costs 
of the service (assessed afterwards by a fi nance offi cer, often several months 
after the social worker’s visit). She commented:
They’re not going to agree to something they don’t know what they’re paying 
for, because I wouldn’t. I wouldn’t dream of it, so why should I expect somebody 
to do that? But that’s what I’m expected to do …
This worker was applying the standards of ordinary life (using the example of 
what she herself would fi nd acceptable) as a test for how social work service 
users should be treated.
Ideal professional integrity
Several interviewees gave accounts of themselves and their work that could be 
interpreted as expressing ideal professional integrity (that is, holding onto the 
ideals of the profession). One interviewee reported quitting his job as Manager 
of a Youth Offending team. His account seemed to relate to strong professional 
integrity in the second sense (holding true to the goals or service ideals of the 
profession, 2.a). This practitioner was a qualifi ed youth worker and seemed 
to hold a view of the goal of the social professions as being about giving care 
and promoting welfare (in this case, young people’s welfare) and doing this is 
a way that respected young people. Whilst he realised that there would always 
be imperfections and compromises, his experience in the youth offending team, 
particularly the inability to provide adequate accommodation for young people, 
who were then left waiting for hours in limbo, was more than he could take.
My central point is that, that young person is very often in crisis or in diffi culty 
at least, and what we’re doing is we’re adding to that. We’re not dealing with it 
effectively. We’re not sort of metaphorically putting our arm round that young 
person and saying ‘we need to get you on an even keel here’.
This worker clearly had a view of what ‘we’, as social professionals, should 
be doing with young people in diffi culty – which could be described as a kind 
of ‘care’. He continued:
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And the number of times I went home, having gone through that, and having 
that experience with young people, and it’s no secret round the whole youth 
offending service that there’s disgust with it. And I just sort of said, I mean, I 
said to [line manager] very early on, that it wasn’t for me, because I couldn’t 
be part of that, you know.
The way he told his story, it seems like he found the work to be threat to his 
integrity both as a ‘good’ professional and as a person.
But in the end it was … it was getting to me so much, you know, that I had to 
kind of move for my own … for myself. Because it’s …I think anybody who cares 
about people and who sees that, and who comes up against the brick walls, you 
know, on a daily basis, you can only take so much really, as one person.
He ended his account by saying that if he had not quit the job, ‘I think it would 
have a lasting effect on my own self really’. In this account the practitioner 
seems to be justifying leaving the job as a way of preserving his personal and 
professional integrity.
This practitioner’s account echoes the comments made by an emergency 
duty social worker who said: ‘I’m trying to fi ght hard against being cynical’; 
‘It’s not worthwhile any more’. This could be categorised as ‘burn out’ due to 
the focus on crisis in emergency social work. As he said, quite often ‘I’m just 
there by myself and it’s not very pleasant’. But he also commented in relation 
to knocking on people’s doors in the night to check out reported suspicions 
in relation to child protection : ‘It’s not the right way to be doing it. There’s 
other ways’. He continued:
We’re told repeatedly from the Director [of Social Services] down, if in any 
doubt remove the child. It’s easier to defend ourselves by over-reacting than 
under-reacting.
He felt this way of doing things was ‘unhealthy for the profession of social 
work’, which should pay more attention to ‘how you regard people; how you 
treat people’, and he indicated that he was looking to leave the job.
Several other senior practitioners working in statutory social services 
reported feeling ‘disillusioned’, ‘quite upset’ and fi nding aspects of the job 
‘quite disturbing’. However, in contrast to the two practitioners quoted above, 
they seemed to fi nd the jobs overall worthwhile, maintaining their vision of 
what ‘good social work’ is and doing ‘the right thing’ even though the job 
may not require it. These seem to be examples of maintaining professional 
integrity in an organisational climate where some of the professional values 
had been lost. For example, a child protection and review manager commented 
(my italics):
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Once you stop putting down what you think is right for the child because you 
can’t get that resource, I think we’re in a very, very serious situation. Because 
once you stop recommending it, nobody’s ever going to know. So I will always 
say, this is what should happen.
Similarly a child care team manager commented:
It’s about being very conscious of the individual needs of the people we’re 
trying to serve. I would never override the individual needs of a young person or 
family just because our procedure said that at that point that X, Y or Z needed 
to happen.
These last two practitioners gave accounts of themselves as holding 
unconditional commitments, based on what they perceived to be the goals of 
the professional work, regardless of what may be required by the employing 
agency.
In the fi rst two examples the practitioners gave accounts of how they 
left or desired to leave their jobs to preserve their professional integrity. In 
the last two examples, the practitioners gave accounts suggesting they were 
able to maintain their professional integrity while continuing to work in a 
diffi cult climate.1 
Professionalism
A social worker, working in a different youth offending team from that 
mentioned earlier, gave an account of an ethical diffi culty he experienced when 
asked to provide a job reference for a young man he had supervised through 
his term in prison for assault. He felt he should call in the young person and 
discuss what it would mean for him to have a reference written by a youth 
offending worker. He commented that he felt it was ‘fair’ to explain to him, 
and he also ‘felt a bit sorry for him’. But his line manager did not understand 
why the worker thought this and did not think it necessary.
I felt a bit uneasy about it … that’s an example where your ethics, your social 
work [ethics is] sometimes beating against the system we’re in now, and I can’t 
really see any way round it.
This seems to be a case that raised issues for the practitioner in relation to 
the weak version of holding to the principles of the profession (2.b). This 
practitioner felt there was an issue at stake in compromising what he felt 
were the currently accepted standards of social work, but in this case could 
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not ‘see any way round it’ and was prepared to live with the outcome, having 
at least made the case for why he thought his proposed course of action to 
be important. He commented that when his line manager asked him ‘what’s 
the meaning?’, he said ‘ethics and confi dentiality and all that’. We noted that 
this weak version of holding to current principles and standards might more 
appropriately be characterised as professionalism rather than professional 
integrity. And this example seems to fi t that description as a challenge to the 
worker’s professionalism as a social worker.
Another account was given by a qualifi ed nurse working in the same youth 
offending team, who was struggling to insist on adhering to his interpretation 
of the professional standards current in nursing in relation to confi dentiality 
of patient records and correspondence. The requirements of inter-agency and 
inter-professional working are bringing such confl icts increasingly to the fore 
(see Banks, 2004, Chapter 5).
Concluding comments: Professional integrity and the 
ethics of resistance
The social welfare practitioners I have quoted above were giving accounts 
of aspects of their professional lives that were in effect accounts of them 
working at their professional integrity. Yet in the course of everyday practice, 
integrity per se does not seem to be identifi ed or discussed, and it is not a term 
commonly found in the professional literature. The new codes of practice 
produced by the general councils in the UK (for example, General Social 
Care Council, 2002) do not mention professional integrity, although they do 
include a section on the qualities of social care workers (honest, trustworthy, 
reliable, dependable). The ‘archaic’ connotations of the term ‘integrity’ may 
not be helpful, nor its association with formal consistency or grand life plans 
and quests.
However, it is interesting to note that the revised version of the code of 
ethics of the British Association of Social Workers (2001) includes ‘integrity’ 
as one of the fi ve key values, following the example of several other codes 
(Australian Association of Social Workers, 2000; National Association of 
Social Workers, 1996). Furthermore, when there are major cases of fraud, 
dishonesty and public scandals, then integrity is sometimes called for and 
valued. For example, the Nolan principles of conduct in public life (stimulated 
by a series of scandals, particularly over the private fi nancial interests of 
Members of Parliament) include ‘integrity’ as one of the seven principles 
(Nolan Committee, 1996).
As a term that describes the way in which people make sense of the 
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values, relationships and commitments that are parts of their lives and work, 
‘professional integrity’ does have some relevance in contemporary professional 
life. It is particularly noteworthy that some of the social workers quoted were 
offering what might be called ‘stories of resistance’. These are different from 
what Taylor and White (2000, pp 98-9, 136-7), following Dingwall (1977), call 
‘atrocity stories’ about how the tellers are badly treated by the system (many 
of the extracts quoted by Jones [2001] are of this type). The accounts that 
embody stories of resistance are about how the practitioners involved held 
out against the system in a diffi cult job. These practitioners gave accounts 
of how they attempted to hold onto a particular vision of a society and of a 
profession, a set of values and principles judged to be important and a view 
of themselves as a ‘good practitioner’ in circumstances that might be at best 
indifferent, and were often hostile to their visions and values.
These extracts demonstrate a need and a capacity on the part of the 
practitioners to make sense of how they act in a work role in the context 
of a broader narrative of ideals, values, character and consistency. Having a 
capacity and the moral competence to do this is important, not so much in 
order that social work as a distinct profession can survive (this may or may 
not be desirable), but so that practitioners working with vulnerable people 
can play a role in challenging systems of which the procedures and outcomes 
often perpetuate and encourage injustice, disrespectful treatment and a lack of 
genuine care and sensitivity. ‘Professional integrity’, as this process of refl exive 
sense-making, is part of what contributes to people’s capacity to ‘blow the 
whistle’ on bad practice, to protest against injustice, to challenge demeaning 
behaviour and to build an alternative to the ‘ethics of distrust’. It is part of 
contributing to the development of better practice and a constant process of 
revision of accepted professional values and commitments in the light of new 
challenges and demands. If social workers are to be able to remain in their jobs 
and maintain professional integrity, rather than quit jobs in order to preserve 
their professional integrity, then they require not just a commitment to a set 
of professional values (as articulated in professional codes) but courage and 
a sense of solidarity. It may be concluded that the concept of professional 
integrity does have some value in current social welfare practice, particularly 
if it can be used as part of an active ethics of resistance, which not only 
maintains commitment to a set of professional values and ideals, but also 
serves to promote their critical re-examination and recreation.
This article has offered a preliminary exploration of the concept and 
practice of professional integrity. Far from dismissing professional integrity as 
an archaic concept, this examination suggests it would be fruitful to conduct 
further empirical and theoretical studies that study how social workers 
perform ‘professional integrity’ during their working lives. In particular it 
will be important to explore how concepts and expressions of professional 
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integrity may relate to notions of refl exive resistance in hostile organisational 
climates.
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Note
1. Whilst some readers might argue that quitting the job because the 
practitioner felt compromised is not an example of maintaining 
professional integrity, I would argue that the accounts given by the fi rst 
two practitioners quoted above can be read in this way. If the practitioner 
went on to take another job in the same profession where conditions were 
more conducive (which the YOT team manager did), then arguably this 
was one way of maintaining professional integrity. The further question 
as to whether it may be a more robust moral position to stay in a diffi cult 
job in certain circumstances is not my concern in this section of paper, 
which is essentially an exploration of the accounts given by practitioners 
themselves, rather than an argument for a particular moral position. 
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